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Notes and Comments
In re Conroy: A Limited Right to Withhold
or Withdraw Artificial Nourishment
"Technology competes with compassion, legal precedent lags,
and controversy is inevitable."'
I. Introduction
In In re Conroy,2 an overwhelming six-to-one majority of
the New Jersey Supreme Court decided that life-sustaining
treatment, including artificial feeding, may be withdrawn from
incompetent, institutionalized, elderly patients with severe and
permanent mental and physical impairments and a limited life
expectancy under detailed judicial guidelines.3 One can see in
Conroy the beginning winds of legal change. To date, Conroy
stands as one of only three appellate court decisions" which have
extended the right to forego life-sustaining treatment to include
the right to remove or withhold artificial nourishment and hy-
dration. In a society where technology has outpaced the legal
and ethical framework which must cope with it, Conroy repre-
sents a significant step by the judiciary toward recognition that
the indication for use of modern sophisticated technology cannot
be the mere availability of that technology. Conroy may, there-
fore, serve as precedent to other states dealing with the devas-
tating consequences of decisionmaking in relation to incompe-
1. Wanzer, Adelstein, Cranford, Federman, Hook, Moertel, Safar, Stone, Taussig &
Van Eys, The Physician's Responsibility Toward Hopelessly Ill Patients, 310 NEw ENG.
J. MED. 955, 959 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Wanzer, The Physician's Responsibility].
2. 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985).
3. See infra text accompanying notes 194-216.
4. See Barber v. Superior Court, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484 (1983);
In re Hier, 464 N.E.2d 959 (Mass. App. Ct.), review denied, 392 Mass. 1101, 465 N.E.2d
261 (1984).
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tent terminally ill patients being sustained by artificial
nourishment and hydration. However, because the court re-
stricts its holding to nursing home residents,5 one may view its
precedential value as somewhat limited.
Part II of this Note examines the right to refuse medical
treatment as it applies to both competent and incompetent pa-
tients. Furthermore, it explores the concept and process of deci-
sionmaking for incompetent patients. Part III sets forth the
facts and procedural history of Conroy, highlighting the majority
and minority opinions of the New Jersey Supreme Court. Part
IV analyzes the opinion of the court, giving particular attention
to the three tests established for decisionmaking, to the associ-
ated procedures required to implement such a decision, and to
the arguments advanced by the dissent in relation to the criteria
for reaching life-or-death decisions. Part V concludes that al-
though the court may have properly expanded the right to
forego life-sustaining treatment to include the right to refuse or
withdraw artificial nourishment and hydration, it did so on un-
reasonably narrow grounds. In an attempt to establish standards
that would apply to all incompetent patients on a precipitous
decline as was Miss Conroy, the court used the sole criterion of
pain as the measure of the best interests of such a person. In so
doing, the court provided a narrow basis for future decisionmak-
ing. Finally, although the court has enunciated a broad substan-
tive right, it appears to have severely limited that right by the
procedures required to implement it.
II. Background
A. Right to Refuse Medical Treatment
1. Competent Patients
The right of competent adults to refuse medical treatment
derives from two sources - the common law right of bodily in-
tegrity and self-determination and the constitutional right of
privacy. The common law recognizes and protects the right of
bodily integrity. "No right is held more sacred, or is more care-
fully guarded, by the common law, than the right of every indi-
5. In re Conroy, 98 N.J. at 342 n.1, 486 A.2d at 1219 n.1.
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vidual to the possession and control of his own person, free from
all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and un-
questionable authority of law."' As early as 1914, Justice Car-
dozo articulated the right of "[e]very human being of adult years
and sound mind . . . to determine what shall be done with his
own body; and a surgeon who performs an operation without his
patient's consent commits an assault, for which he is liable in
damages."'
The right of the medical patient to exercise bodily control
and self-determination has been embodied in the doctrine of in-
formed consent. "Under this doctrine, no medical procedure
may be performed without a patient's consent, obtained after
explanation of the nature of the treatment, substantial risks,
and alternative therapies."8 The doctrine of informed consent
has two elements. First, it must be informed; there must be ade-
quate disclosure of the proposed procedure as well as its antici-
pated risks and benefits. Second, there must be valid consent
which encompasses a right of choice; the patient must have the
right to refuse treatment as well as to consent to it.'
Indeed, the exercise of self-determination may also include
the refusal of lifesaving medical treatment. "[E]ach man is con-
sidered to be master of his own body, and he may, if he be of
sound mind, expressly prohibit the performance of life-saving
surgery, or other medical treatment."'0
6. Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891). Here, the Court repudi-
ated attempts to compel a personal injury plaintiff to undergo pretrial medical
examination.
7. Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 129-30, 105 N.E. 92, 93
(1914). The right to decline lifesaving medical care was not at issue in this case. Rather,
this case concerned the alleged unauthorized removal of a fibroid tumor, when only an
examination had been consented to by the patient.
8. Cantor, A Patient's Decision to Decline Life-Saving Medical Treatment: Bodily
Integrity Versus the Preservation of Life, 26 RUTGERS L. REV. 228, 237 (1973). The prin-
ciple of informed consent holds true except in an emergency. See Dunham v. Wright, 423
F.2d 940, 941 (3d Cir. 1970).
9. Clarke, The Choice to Refuse or Withhold Medical Treatment: The Emerging
Technology and Medical-Ethical Consensus, 13 CREIGHTON L. REV. 795, 800 (1980). See
also In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 347, 486 A.2d 1209, 1222 (1985) ("The patient's ability to
control his bodily integrity through informed consent is significant only when one recog-
nizes that this right also encompasses a right to informed refusal .... Thus, a competent
adult person generally has the right to decline to have any medical treatment initiated or
continued." (citations omitted)).
10. Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 406-07, 350 P.2d 1093, 1104, clarified, 187
1986]
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Another source of the right to self-determination and the
right to make certain decisions concerning one's body is the un-
written constitutional right of privacy found in the penumbra of
specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights." In the context of med-
ical treatment and decisionmaking, this constitutional guarantee
of privacy has been found to be broad enough to protect a wo-
man's decision to terminate her pregnancy under certain circum-
stances.12 Furthermore, in In re Quinlan, s the New Jersey Su-
preme Court extended the right of privacy to include the right
to decline medical treatment under certain circumstances, even
if that decision might lead to the patient's death." Subsequent
courts have allowed competent patients to withdraw consent as
well as refuse potentially lifesaving treatment. 15
Kan. 186, 354 P.2d 670 (1960). This was the first case in which a court expressly ac-
knowledged the right to refuse lifesaving treatment, although the issue in the case in-
volved the sufficiency of the physician's disclosure of treatment risks and consequences
to the patient.
11. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (state statute prohibiting use
of contraceptives in marriage declared unconstitutional). The ill-defined boundaries of
this right of privacy have been extended to encompass an individual's right to procreate,
Carey v. Populations Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977); to receive contraceptives regard-
less of marital status, Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); and to marry, Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). The constitutional right of privacy has been recognized in
"matters relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, and child
rearing and education." Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 713 (1976).
12. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
13. 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976). The Quinlan court
was the first state supreme court to authorize removal of life-sustaining equipment that
was maintaining the existence of an irreversibly comatose patient who was not brain
dead.
14. Accord Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728,
742, 370 N.E.2d 417, 426 (1977). In the words of the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts:
The constitutional right to privacy ... is an expression of the sanctity of individ-
ual free choice and self-determination as fundamental constituents of life. The
value of life as so perceived is lessened not by a decision to refuse treatment, but
by the failure to allow a competent human being the right of choice.
Id. at 742, 370 N.E.2d at 426.
By establishing the right to refuse life-sustaining treatment as a constitutional pri-
vacy right, the court raised this right to a fundamental status. As such, it could not be
overcome unless a compelling state interest in opposition could be demonstrated. See
infra text accompanying notes 23-37.
15. See, Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978), aff'd, 379 So.
2d 359 (Fla. 1980); In re Quackenbush, 156 N.J. Super. 282, 383 A.2d 785 (Morris County
Ct. 1978). In In re Quackenbush, the court did not compel surgery but instead allowed
the patient to refuse amputation of both legs above the knee and possibly amputation of
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol6/iss2/3
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2. Right to Refuse Treatment Extended to Incompetent
Patients
While it is clear that competent and informed adults have a
right to refuse medical treatment, even life-sustaining therapy, a
problem arises with regard to incompetent persons- those
who are unable to make their wishes known. 6 The Quinlan
court, in addressing just this issue, extended the right to refuse
medical treatment to incompetent patients.17 The court found
"no thread of logic" that would prevent extending the right to
decline treatment to an incompetent patient.'8 "[H]er right of
privacy.., should not be discarded solely on the basis that her
condition prevents her conscious exercise of the choice."' 9
The right of the incompetent terminally ill patient to refuse
life-sustaining treatment or to be removed from artificial life-
sustaining equipment has been widely recognized.20 "[T]he sub-
stantive rights of the competent and the incompetent person are
the same in regard to the right to decline potentially life-pro-
longing treatment."'2 As the value of human dignity extends to
all human beings, whether they are mentally competent or not,
so must the right of privacy extend to incompetent as well as
competent patients. 22
both legs entirely. On balance, the court reasoned that such extensive bodily invasion
was "sufficient to make the State's interest in the preservation of life give way to Robert
Quackenbush's right of privacy to decide his future regardless of a dim prognosis." In re
Quackenbush, 156 N.J. Super. at -, 383 A.2d at 789. The court recognized that both
decisional law and constitutional law invest a competent patient with rights that over-
come the interest in the preservation of life.
In Perlmutter, life support apparatus could only be withdrawn from a terminally ill
competent adult who had minor children and whose family unanimously approved of the
treatment termination.
16. For an explanation of when a person will be deemed incompetent, see infra text
accompanying notes 42-47.
17. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976).
18. Id. at 39, 355 A.2d at 663.
19. Id. at 41, 355 A.2d at 664.
20. Courts have followed and reinforced this extension of the rights of competent
persons to incompetent persons. See Severns v. Wilmington Medical Center, Inc., 421
A.2d 1334 (Del. 1980); John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. Bludworth, 452 So. 2d
921 (Fla. 1984); In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981); In re Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d 114, 660 P.2d 738 (1983).
21. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 736, 370 N.E.2d at 423.
22. Id. at 745, 370 N.E.2d at 427.
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3. Right to Refuse Treatment Not an Absolute Right
Neither the common law right nor the constitutional right
to refuse medical treatment is absolute. Where lifesaving care is
involved, an individual's right to self-determination and bodily
integrity may collide with an important or compelling state in-
terest. A patient's rights must, therefore, be balanced against
potential countervailing societal interests.
The state retains four fundamental interests in medical de-
cisions: 1) the preservation of life, 2) the prevention of suicide,
3) the protection of innocent third parties, and 4) maintaining
the ethical integrity of the medical profession.2 3 In the case of
lifesaving treatment, only two state interests appear to receive
particular consideration by the courts - the preservation of life
and the protection of innocent third parties.
The state's interest in preserving life is considered the most
significant.2 4 The state's interest in relation to the competent
patient generally yields to the patient's much stronger interest
in directing the course of his own life. 25 In relation to an incom-
petent patient, the claimed state interests set forth in Quinlan
were essentially the preservation of life and the "defense of the
right of the physician to administer medical treatment according
to his best judgment. 2 6 In balancing the state's interest against
the realistic chances for Karen Quinlan's recovery and the na-
23. See id. at 741, 370 N.E.2d at 425. After surveying the leading cases, the
Saikewicz court identified these interests as being potentially applicable to cases of med-
ical intervention. These principles were primarily derived from Application of Pres. &
Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S.
978 (1964). There, a hospital sought and was granted permission to perform a blood
transfusion necessary to save a patient's life where the patient was unwilling to consent
due to religious beliefs. Despite previously expressed contrary sentiments of the patient,
the court justified its decision by reasoning that its purpose was to protect state interests
viewed as having greater import than the individual right. See also Perlmutter, 362 So.
2d at 162; In re Torres, 357 N.W.2d 332, 339 (Minn. 1984); In re Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d at
122, 660 P.2d at 743.
24. See Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 741, 370 N.E.2d at 425.
25. See, e.g., In re Quackenbush, 156 N.J. Super. at 290, 383 A.2d at 789 (holding
that the extensive bodily invasion is sufficient to make the state's interest in the preser-
vation of life give way to the patient's right of privacy to decide his own future regardless
of the absence of a dim prognosis). See also Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d at 162 (holding that
even though a state's interest in saving life is compelling, the compelling quality wanes
as the patient's chances for recovery diminish).
26. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 40, 355 A.2d at 663.
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ture of her care, the court was faced with circumstances quite
unlike those cases where the medical procedure required "con-
stituted a minimal bodily invasion and the chances of recovery
and return to functioning life were very good. '2 7 Thus, the court
found that "the State's interest.., weakens and the individual's
right to privacy grows as the degree of bodily invasion increases
and the prognosis dims. '2 8
The state's interest in the prevention of suicide has failed to
compel medical intervention in relation to a patient's right to
refuse lifesaving treatment. Death resulting from failure to use
life support systems on a terminally ill patient is not suicide but
death from natural causes.29 Furthermore, some courts have held
that a patient refusing life support did not have the specific in-
tent to die.3"
The state's interest in protection of innocent third parties,
particularly minor children, is rooted in the concept of parens
patriae5 1 The possible impact on minor children of a decision to
forego treatment could weigh heavily in the court's balancing
process. The state's interest may well be superior to an adult's
right of privacy or self-determination when there is no available
source of support and care for the dependents.2
27. Id. at 41, 355 A.2d at 664.
28. Id.
29. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d at 162. See also In re Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d at 123, 660
P.2d at 743.
30. See Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 743 n.11, 370 N.E.2d at 426 n.11; In re Colyer, 99
Wash. 2d at 123, 660 P.2d at 743 ("A death which occurs after the removal of life sus-
taining systems is from natural causes neither set in motion nor intended by the
patient.").
31. The phrase parens patriae refers to the state's traditional responsibility for su-
pervising the affairs of incompetents.
32. See, e.g., Application of Pres. & Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d
at 1006. The court authorized the hospital to administer blood transfusions to a Jeho-
vah's Witness who had a seven month old son and was unwilling to consent to treatment.
Id.
The state, as parens patriae, will not allow a parent to abandon a child, and so it
should not allow this most ultimate of voluntary abandonments. The patient had
a responsibility to the community to care for her infant. Thus the people had an
interest in preserving the life of this mother.
Id. at 1008. See also United States v. George, 239 F. Supp. 752 (D. Conn. 1965). In
George, the court authorized a transfusion for a patient who said he would not agree to
the procedure, but further indicated that he would not resist a court ordered transfusion.
Id. at 753.
1986]
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Finally, the impact of the state's interest in protecting the
ethical integrity of the medical profession has been lessened by
prevailing medical ethical standards which do not always require
medical treatment to be administered at all costs. 3 3 When a doc-
tor follows the choice of a competent adult patient who refuses
medical treatment, he cannot be deemed to have violated his
professional responsibilities.3 4 Furthermore, "there is reliable in-
formation that for many years physicians and members of pa-
tients' families, often in consultation with religious counselors,
have in actuality been making decisions to withhold or to with-
draw life support procedures from incurably ill patients incapa-
ble of making the critical decisions for themselves. '35
Although in most instances, the right to self-determination
outweighs countervailing state interests, 3 there are instances, al-
33. Prevailing medical ethical practice seems to recognize that the dying are more
often in need of comfort than treatment. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 743-44, 370 N.E.2d at
426. "[P]hysicians distinguish between curing the ill and comforting and easing the dy-
ing; .. . they refuse to treat the curable as if they were dying or ought to die, and...
they have sometimes refused to treat the hopeless and dying as if they were curable." In
re Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 47, 355 A.2d at 667 .
On March 15, 1986, at a meeting on medicine and ethics co-sponsored by the Ameri-
can Medical Association and the Hastings Center, the judicial council of the American
Medical Association issued its most recent opinion concerning ethical standards and the
care of patients in irreversible comas. Under this new ruling, it would be ethical for
doctors to withhold "all means of life prolonging medical treatment," including food and
water, from patients in irreversible comas even if death was not imminent. According to
the judicial council, such therapy should only be withheld when a patient's coma "is
beyond doubt irreversible and there are adequate safeguards to confirm the accuracy of
the diagnosis." Altman, A.M.A. Sets Ethics on Care of Dying, N.Y. Times, Mar. 16,
1986, § 1, at 1, col. 1. According to the new American Medical Association opinion, "[Ilife
prolonging medical treatment includes medication and artificially or technologically sup-
plied respiration, nutrition or hydration. In treating a terminally ill or irreversibly coma-
tose patient, the physician should determine whether the benefits of treatment outweigh
its burdens. At all times, the dignity of the patient should be maintained." Id.
34. In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d at 377, 420 N.E.2d at 71, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 273.
35. Id. at 385, 420 N.E.2d at 75, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 277 (Jones, J., dissenting). See
generally the sources cited in In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d at 385 n.3, 420 N.E.2d at 75 n.3,
420 N.Y.S.2d at 277 n.3.
36. The Perlmutter court, in considering the request of a competent adult that life
support apparatus be removed, summarized its balancing process as follows:
It is all very convenient to insist on continuing Mr. Perlmutter's life so that there
can be no question of foul play, no resulting civil liability and no possible trespass
on medical ethics. However, it is quite another matter to do so at the patient's
sole expense and against his competent will, thus inflicting never ending physical
torture on his body until the inevitable, but artificially suspended, moment of
death. Such a course of conduct invades the patient's constitutional right of pri-
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol6/iss2/3
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beit very few, when the court may decide in favor of the state's
compelling interest. 7
B. Implementing the Right of Refusal for Incompetent
Patients
1. Competent Patients vs. Incompetent Patients
For the purpose of consenting to medical treatment, a pa-
tient is considered competent if he understands the nature of a
proposed treatment and the consequences if treatment is not ad-
ministered, and if he is capable of exercising choice. 8 A compe-
tent patient has the mental ability to make a rational decision,
which includes the ability to understand the information con-
veyed, to "appreciate all relevant facts, and to reach a rational
judgment upon such facts."3 Furthermore, while a patient's
choice may appear unwise, foolish, or ridiculous to others, the
patient may still be considered competent as long as he or she
comprehends the nature and consequences of the decision.40 Le-
vacy, removes his freedom of choice and invades his right to self-determine.
Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d at 164. See also Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 742, 370 N.E.2d at 426;
In re Quackenbush, 156 N.J. Super. at 290, 383 A.2d at 790.
37. See Application of Pres. & Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d 1000
(D.C. Cir. 1964). See also Commissioner of Correction v. Myers, 379 Mass. 255, 399
N.E.2d 452 (1979). In Meyers, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that
the state's interest in upholding the authority of the prison administrators overcame the
incarcerated competent patient's right to decline lifesaving hemodialysis treatment. The
patient in this case was a young state prison inmate who required regular hemodialysis
treatments to remain alive. The patient refused further treatment. The court ordered the
continuation of treatment after determining that he was merely attempting to manipu-
late the prison system, i.e., attempting to coerce his transfer to another facility. For other
cases overriding the refusal right, see United States v. George, 239 F. Supp. 752 (D.
Conn. 1965); Powell v. Columbian Presbyterian Medical Center, 49 Misc. 2d 215, 267
N.Y.S.2d 450 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1965).
38. ROBERTSON, THE RIGHTS OF THE CRITICALLY ILL 40 (1983).
39. See Department of Human Servs. v. Northern, 563 S.W.2d 197, 209 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 1978).
40. See In re Yetter, 62 Pa. D. & C.2d 619 (1973). In Yetter, the court upheld the
right of a state mental institution inmate, diagnosed as schizophrenic, to refuse to con-
sent to a biopsy for suspected breast cancer. The court was convinced she understood the
nature of the procedure and the consequences of refusing. See also Lane v. Candura, 376
N.E.2d 1232 (Mass. App. Ct. 1978). In Lane, the court upheld the right of a seventy-
seven year old diabetic woman to refuse amputation of her gangrenous feet even though
the decision seemed irrational to her doctors. The court found ample evidence that the
patient was aware of the consequences of refusing the surgery; she retained the "ability
to understand that in rejecting the amputation she ... [chose] death over life." Id. at
9
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gally, patients are presumed to be competent to make decisions
for their own care, unless declared otherwise by a court.
Patients may be incompetent for any of several reasons. Ad-
vanced stages of an illness or a combination of illnesses may
render a patient unable to understand the nature and conse-
quences of a choice of treatment in his or her care. Severe head
trauma or brain hypoxia 42 secondary to drug overdose may also
result in patient incompetence. Furthermore, advanced age may
bring on senility or disorientation, especially when trauma or a
disabling disease is present.43 The emotional trauma accompany-
ing physical illness may undermine comprehension and judg-
ment. "Fear and pain may rob the patient of the capacity to
consent rationally to further medical care.4
A patient may be incompetent for reasons unrelated to the
trauma or illness requiring treatment. A patient may be severely
mentally retarded or an earlier illness or trauma may prevent
the patient from making an informed decision to accept or to
decline medical treatment. Certainly an unconscious patient is
incompetent to decide.
Resolving doubts about competency is the responsibility of
the courts. As a practical matter, the treating physician will ini-
tially determine whether there are doubts about a patient's com-
petency to decide for or against medical treatment.4 The doctor
may confer with nurses, family members, and the patient, as
well as call in other physicians or psychiatrists. Any treating
physician who suspects that a patient is incompetent should
seek a judicial determination of competency, and if the patient
is deemed incompetent, ask that a guardian be appointed to
consent to medical care.46 "A judicial decision will give the par-
ties some certainty about the legality of their actions, and may
prevent the abuse of a patient who is helpless to protect his
1236.
41. See Lane v. Candura, 376 N.E.2d 1232 (Mass. App. Ct. 1978), where the court
emphasized that one's competence is presumed and that irrationality is not analogous to
incompetence.
42. Brain hypoxia is decreased amount of oxygen to the brain.
43. D. MEYERS, MEDICO-LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF DEATH AND DYING 267 (1981).
44. Id.
45. ROBERTSON, supra note 38, at 43.
46. Id.
[Vol. 6:219
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right to have care withheld.' 7
2. Standards That Have Guided Decisionmaking for
Incompetents
Recognizing that the rights of incompetent patients to self-
determination, bodily integrity, and privacy cannot be exercised
by the incompetent patients themselves, the courts have devel-
oped doctrines of surrogate decisionmaking to implement the
rights of incompetent patients. The two standards that have tra-
ditionally guided decisionmaking for incompetent patients are
the "substituted judgment" standard and the "best interests"
standard.
a. The Substituted Judgment Standard
The substituted judgment standard is a subjective one re-
quiring that a surrogate decisionmaker attempt to reach the de-
cision that the incompetent person would have made if he or she
had been able to choose.' 8 In Quinlan, the first judicial decision
on withholding treatment to adopt the substituted judgment
standard, the patient's father, as her guardian, was empowered
to make a judgment on her behalf.' 9 On the basis of his determi-
nation of what her preference would have been, her right of pri-
vacy and self-determination could be exercised.50
If a putative decision by Karen to permit this non-cognitive,
vegetative existence to terminate by natural forces is re-
garded as a valuable incident of her right of privacy, as we
47. Id. at 45.
48. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BI-
OMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT
132 (1983) [hereinafter cited as PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION REPORT]. The substituted judg-
ment standard was first applied to the determination of a medical issue in an organ
transplant case in Strunk v. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145 (Ky. Ct. App. 1969). The court
authorized removal of a kidney from an incompetent adult donor to save the life of his
twin brother who had a fatal kidney disease. The court reasoned that the organ donation
was for the "benefit" of the incompetent donor, that he would have wanted to donate the
kidney to his brother on whom he was emotionally dependent. See also Robertson, Or-
gan Donations by Incompetents and the Substituted Judgment Doctrine, 76 COLUM. L.
REV. 48 (1976).
49. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 41, 355 A.2d at 664.
50. Buchanan, The Limits of Proxy Decisionmaking for Incompetents, 29 UCLA L.
REV. 386, 389 (1981).
1986]
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believe it to be, then it should not be discarded solely on the
basis that her condition prevents her conscious exercise of
the choice. The only practical way to prevent destruction of
the right is to permit the guardian and family of Karen to
render their best judgment ... as to whether she would ex-
ercise it in these circumstances."1
As one commentator remarked, "the Quinlan court thus be-
stowed an illusory privacy right upon the incompetent patient
and gave the actual decision-making power to her guardian...
[T]he Quinlan court essentially gave the decision-making power
to a guardian and clothed it with constitutional legitimacy.
' 52
The substituted judgment standard was recognized in Quin-
lan as the only means by which the right of self-determination
could be exercised and preserved for the incompetent patient.
Since the right of self-determination includes not only the right
to consent to medical treatment but also the right to refuse it, a
surrogate decisionmaker applying the substituted judgment
standard could refuse treatment for the incompetent patient
even if such a decision would not appear to be in the best inter-
est of the incompetent or in agreement with what a reasonable
person may have chosen in similar circumstances.
Following the Quinlan lead, the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts acknowledged the constitutionally protected pri-
vacy right to decline life-prolonging treatment in Super-
intendant of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz.5" The
Saikewicz court was faced with a treatment decision for a con-
genital incompetent who had never been able to formulate a
treatment preference. In finding that the right to refuse treat-
ment is not forfeited by the incompetent patient, the Saikewicz
court presented its own version of substituted judgment:
We believe that both the guardian ad litem in his recom-
mendation and the judge in his decision should have at-
tempted (as they did) to ascertain the incompetent person's
actual interests and preferences. In short, the decision in
51. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 41, 355 A.2d at 664.
52. Chapman, Fateful Treatment Choices for Critically Ill Adults, Part I: The Ju-
dicial Model, 37 ARK. L. REv. 908, 929-30 (1984).
53. See Buchanan, supra note 50, at 389-90; Gutheil & Appelbaum, Substituted
Judgment: Best Interests in Disguise, 13 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 8 (1983).
54. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 736, 370 N.E.2d at 423.
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cases such as this should be that which would be made by
the incompetent person, if that person were competent, but
taking into account the present and future incompetency of
the individual as one of the factors which would necessarily
enter into the decision-making process of the competent
person.5
5
Subsequently, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in
In re Spring6 again applied the substituted judgment standard
and exercised the right to refuse dialysis treatments on behalf of
the incompetent patient.
b. The Best Interests Standard
Surrogate decisionmakers often lack a basis for making a
substituted judgment for incompetent patients because those
patients in earlier times of competence may not have considered,
much less communicated, their thoughts and feelings about po-
tential life-sustaining treatment. Furthermore, as in the case of
Joseph Saikewicz, some patients have never been competent so
that their subjective wishes about such treatment cannot possi-
bly be ascertained. In these situations, surrogate decisionmakers
"must try to make a choice for the patient that seeks to imple-
ment what is in that person's best interests by reference to more
objective, societally shared criteria. 5 7 Such a standard relies
solely on protection of the patient's welfare rather than on the
value of self-determination."
In determining whether a particular course of treatment
would be in a patient's best interests, the surrogate deci-
55. Id. at 752, 370 N.E.2d at 431.
56. 380 Mass. 629, 405 N.E.2d 115 (1980). Earle Spring, a senile seventy-seven year
old nursing home resident, suffered from a disorienting organic brain syndrome as well
as total kidney failure. Unlike Saikewicz, he had at an earlier time been competent and
consented to hemodialysis treatments. Id. at 636, 405 N.E.2d at 120. (Hemodialysis
treatments consist of artificial maintenance of kidney function via regularly scheduled
cleansing of blood impurities.) Spring was expected to live about five years if his treat-
ments were continued. His wife and son petitioned the court for authorization to discon-
tinue dialysis treatments. The Massachussets Appeals Court approved the permission
granted by the probate court to discontinue treatment, finding that if Spring had been
competent, he would have wished to discontinue treatment given his physical condition.
Id. at 630, 405 N.E.2d at 117.
57. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 48, at 134-35.
58. Id. at 135.
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sionmaker must consider whether treatment will bring relief
from suffering, whether it will preserve or restore functioning,
and what will be the extent of life sustained. "An accurate as-
sessment will encompass consideration of the satisfaction of pre-
sent desires, the opportunities for future satisfactions, and the
possibility of developing or regaining the capacity for self-
determination." 9
One commentator has suggested that justice would have
been better served had the Saikewicz court determined the best
interests of Joseph Saikewicz instead of having relied on the
substituted judgment standard.6
A direct, well reasoned judicial paternalism is appropriate in
the case of an institutionalized incompetent whose welfare is
wholly dependent upon the wise decisions of others. This
does not mean that the use of a best interests standard
would lead inevitably to a sensible and humane result. It
would, however, be an honest approach to the problem and
would free the courts from the manipulation of reality which
is necessitated by the use of substituted judgment. Institu-
tionalized congenital incompetents are in need of the state's
duty to protect life. This strong presumption in favor of life,
anchored in the common law and our most sacred demo-
cratic declarations, should not be overcome for helpless con-
genital incompetents by the fiction of substituted
judgment. 1
In fact, there are those who believe that under the guise of
substituted judgment, courts have reached their decisions based
on what they believed was in the best interests of the patient.2
In Quinlan, the New Jersey Supreme Court showed strong con-
cern for the best interests of the profoundly damaged patient.
The court endorsed relief from the undesired prolongation of the
dying process where continued therapy offers "neither human
nor humane benefit." 63 Thus, even though the court never spe-
cifically indicated that the applicable standard would be the
"best interest" of the patient, there certainly appears to be lan-
59. Id.
60. Chapman, supra note 52, at 938.
61. Id. (emphasis in original). See also Buchanan, supra note 50, at 397 n.36.
62. See Gutheil & Appelbaum, supra note 53.
63. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 47, 355 A.2d at 667.
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guage supporting that formula.
Where a substituted judgment for an incompetent patient is
based on the presumed rather than the actual desires of the now
incompetent patient, the results may often be equivalent to the
application of the best interests standard. This would be so if
persons are presumed to act in their own best interests. The ad-
vantage of the substituted judgment standard, however, is that
it not only reaffirms the right to self-determination, but it also
allows for refusal of medical treatment even if that would not
appear to be in the best interest of the incompetent.
c. Other Standards
Other courts in deciding right-to-die issues have rejected
the substituted judgment standard in decisionmaking for incom-
petent patients.6 4 The New York Court of Appeals implicitly re-
jected the substituted judgment standard in deciding the fate of
Brother Joseph Fox"6 and John Storar.6 Before becoming coma-
tose, Brother Fox had explicitly requested that his life not be
supported by artificial means. The court agreed that Brother
Fox's respirator could be removed but only because of the clear
and convincing evidence that the patient had no desire to have
his life prolonged by life-sustaining procedures if there were no
hope of recovery. The case of Brother Fox is a "simple, straight-
forward application of the common law principle that the prior
expression of treatment preference of a now incompetent person
must be honored. It is a principle grounded in the autonomy of
the individual and the right to self-determination.""7
John Storar, on the other hand, was a profoundly mentally
retarded fifty-two year old man dying of bladder cancer, not un-
64. See In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, (1981) (deci-
sion based on consolidation of In re Storar and Eichner v. Dillon); In re Colyer, 99 Wash.
2d 114, 660 P.2d 738 (1983).
65. At the age of eighty-three, Brother Fox lapsed into a coma during a surgical
procedure to correct a hernia. After suffering cardiac arrest which resulted in loss of
oxygen to the brain and substantial brain damage, he was placed on a respirator to main-
tain his other vital bodily functions. Medical experts concurred that he was in a perma-
nent vegetative state. In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266
(1981).
66. Id. at 371, 420 N.E.2d at 68, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 270.
67. Rockford, More on the Right to Refuse Treatment: Brother Fox and the Men-
tally Ill in New York, L. MED. & HEALTH CARE, Feb. 1983, at 21
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like Joseph Saikewicz. 8 Having been incompetent throughout
his entire life, he had never been able to make a reasoned deci-
sion, let alone one with regard to his preference for medical
treatment. 9 The court found it "unrealistic to attempt to deter-
mine whether he would want to continue potentially life pro-
longing treatment if he were competent. As one of the experts
testified . . . , that would be similar to asking whether 'if it
snowed all summer would it then be winter?' "70 The court re-
jected the fiction of substituted judgment and required the ad-
ministration of blood transfusions over the objections of the pa-
tient's mother.7 1
The Supreme Court of Washington, in In re Colyer,7 2 ap-
pears to have disregarded the substituted judgment standard of
Quinlan and to have established instead a "best judgment" of
the guardian standard to protect and effectuate an incompe-
tent's right to refuse life-sustaining treatment.7 3 "The guardian's
familiarity with the incompetent's character and personality,
prior statements, and general attitude toward medical treatment
will assist in making that judgment. 7 4 This appears to be a
more reasonable approach as there was no evidence that Bertha
Colyer had explicitly expressed any desire to refuse life-sus-
taining treatment.76
As one commentator has noted, the best judgment standard
fundamentally alters the character of the decision in that it
removes the pretense that a third party knows the choice that
an incompetent patient would make.7 6 It is a more "reality-
based solution" than the fiction of substituted judgment, partic-
ularly in those instances where an incompetent never expressed
or was never able to express a preference about foregoing life-
sustaining treatment.7
68. In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d at 373, 420 N.E.2d at 68, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 270-71.
69. Id. at 380, 420 N.E.2d at 72, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 275.
70. Id. at 380, 420 N.E.2d at 72-73, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 275.
71. John Storar died pending appeal.
72. 99 Wash. 2d 114, 660 P.2d 738 (1983).
73. Id. at 128, 660 P.2d at 746.
74. Id. at 131, 660 P.2d at 747.
75. Id. at 132, 660 P.2d at 748.
76. Chapman, supra note 52, at 946.
77. Id.
[Vol. 6:219
16http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol6/iss2/3
IN RE CONROY
3. The Locus of Power: Who Decides for the Incompetent
Patient
All courts appear to agree that the right to refuse lifesaving
medical treatment extends equally to competent as well as in-
competent patients, absent overriding state interests in compel-
ling treatment. However, courts differ in deciding who makes
the decision for the incompetent patient and what procedures
are to be followed to implement an incompetent's substantive
right. The cases decided to date have reached varying results.
All have tried to do what is in the best interests of the in-
competent patient. However, by establishing procedures to
avoid the harm of premature treatment termination, they
may raise the spectre of greater harm: undue and inhumane
prolongation of probably the most traumatic event in the
lives of us all, the death of a close family member."
a. Decisionmaking Within the Patient-Physician-Family
Relationship
The majority of cases appears to favor the patient-physi-
cian-family context for decisionmaking.7 9 In re Quinlan, the
leading case, concerned a patient in a chronic persistent vegeta-
tive state, with no reasonable probability of returning to a cogni-
tive sapient state.8 0 The Quinlan court viewed health care deci-
sionmaking as "primarily within the patient-doctor-family
relationship, 8 1 with review by a hospital ethics committee, but
without need for court involvement.82 The court found that the
necessity of applying to the courts to confirm such a decision
would generally be "inappropriate, not only because that would
be a gratuitious encroachment upon the medical profession's
field of competence, but because it would be impossibly cumber-
some."83 The court considered it essential that physicians exer-
78. D. MEYERS, supra note 43, at 380.
79. See John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921 (Fla.
1984); In re Barry, 445 So. 2d 365 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984); In re Dinnerstein, 6 Mass.
App. Ct. 466, 380 N.E.2d 134 (1978); In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976); and
In re Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d 114, 660 P.2d 738 (1983).
80. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 26, 355 A.2d at 655.
81. Id. at 50, 355 A.2d at 669.
82. Id. at 54, 355 A.2d at 671.
83. Id. at 50, 355 A.2d at 669.
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cise their "independent medical judgments for the well-being of
their dying patients." '84
Upon the concurrence of the guardian and family of Karen,
should the responsible attending physicians conclude that
there is no reasonable possibility of Karen's ever emerging
from her present comatose condition to a cognitive, sapient
state and that the life-support apparatus now being admin-
istered to Karen should be discontinued, they shall consult
with the hospital "Ethics Committee" or like body of the
institution in which Karen is then hospitalized. If that con-
sultative body agrees that there is no reasonable possibility
of Karen's ever emerging from her present comatose condi-
tion to a cognitive, sapient state, the present life-support
system may be withdrawn and said action shall be without
any civil or criminal liability therefor on the part of any par-
ticipant, whether guardian, physician, hospital or others.85
In In re Dinnerstein,86 the court also placed decisionmaking
for an incompetent patient with the physician in accordance
with family wishes when the patient is in the terminal stages of
an "unremitting, incurable mortal illness. '87 More recently, in In
re Barry,88 the decision to refuse treatment was found to be pri-
marily in the hands of the parents and their medical advisors.
The Barry case represents one of the first judicial decisions up-
holding the right of the parents of a terminally ill infant to exer-
cise the infant's right to have life support equipment removed.
The court noted approvingly that "decisions of this character
have traditionally been made within the privacy of the family
relationship based on competent medical advice and consulta-
tion by the family with their religious advisors, if that be their
persuasion."8 9
Furthermore, in John F. Kennedy Memorial Hospital, Inc.
v. Bludworth,90 the court held that the incompetent's right may
be exercised either by a close family member or by a guardian
without prior judicial approval or the consensus of a hospital
84. Id. at 49, 355 A.2d at 668.
85. Id. at 54, 355 A.2d at 671.
86. 6 Mass. App. Ct. 466, 380 N.E.2d 134 (1978).
87. Id. at 474-75, 380 N.E.2d at 138.
88. 445 So. 2d 365 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
89. Id. at 371.
90. 452 So. 2d 921 (Fla. 1984).
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ethics committee or prognosis board."' The court focused pri-
marily on the medical nature of the decision to discontinue
treatment in support of its rejection of judicial involvement. It
reasoned, as did the court in Quinlan, that "doctors, in consulta-
tion with close family members are in the best position to make
these decisions. The focal point of such decisions should be
whether there is a reasonable medical expectation of the pa-
tient's return to a cognitive life as distinguished from the forced
continuance of a vegetative existence.'92
The physician's role in decisionmaking has received further
support from commentators, most notably Dr. Arnold Relman,
Editor of the New England Journal of Medicine. Relman con-
tends that the physician should be the key decisionmaker since
physicians have always been involved in decisions affecting the
life or death of a patient and they are expected to keep their
patients' interests paramount.9 3 "The traditional responsibilities
of the physician demand that he make judgments to treat, or not
to treat, which in effect will determine whether, and for how
long, and in what condition, the patient is likely to live or die."'94
Both patients and families rely heavily on the professional judg-
ment of their physician95 who is obligated to confer with, to in-
form, and to be guided by his patients or their next of kin. 6
Relman maintains that "there is nothing more crucial to a phy-
sician's professional role than the making of such decisions. ''97
This emphasis on the primary role of the physician has gen-
erated charges of paternalism from other commentators who
would prefer to deemphasize the role of the physician.98 One
criticism of the physician as decisionmaker has been the absence
of safeguards which would be found in the judicial forum. That
91. Id. at 926.
92. Id.
93. Relman, The Saikewicz Decision: A Medical Viewpoint, 4 AM. J.L. & MED. 233,
236 (1978).
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 237.
98. See, e.g., Baron, Medical Paternalism & the Rule of Law: A Reply to Dr.
Relman, 4 AM. J.L. & MED. 337 (1979); Buchanan, Medical Paternalism or Legal Imperi-
alism: Not the Only Alternatives for Handling Saikewicz-type cases, 5 AM. J.L. & MED.
97 (1979).
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is,
[tihere are no institutional frameworks that require doctors
to develop principles of decisionmaking that are consistent
from one doctor to another and from one time to another.
As a result, few doctors have worked out principles of deci-
sionmaking that will survive even the most rudimentary
criticism, and decisions which are made on the same set of
facts will differ from day to day and from doctor to doctor.9
b. Judicial Decisionmaking
The basis for judicial decisionmaking rests on a "gradual
development of a body of common law principles, based in socie-
tal values, that can be used for deciding fundamental questions
with which a 'new technology' is now challenging our society."100
The leading case requiring judicial decisionmaking with respect
to questions of discontinuing treatment for incompetent patients
was Saikewicz. "We take a dim view of any attempt to shift the
ultimate decision-making responsibility away from the duly es-
tablished courts of proper jurisdiction to any committee, panel
or group, ad hoc or permanent." 101 The Saikewicz court thus re-
jected the Quinlan approach of entrusting treatment decisions
to the patient's guardian, family, physician and hospital ethics
committee.102 Instead, the court saw such questions of life and
death as requiring the "process of detached but passionate in-
vestigation and decision that forms the ideal on which the judi-
cial branch of government was created."10 3
The same Massachusetts court, in deciding that the guard-
ian need not authorize any further life-prolonging hemodialysis
treatments for an incompetent patient, made it clear that judi-
cial approval is not always required prior to withholding treat-
ment from an incompetent patient.104 In Spring, the court sug-
gested a variety of factors that should be taken into account in
deciding whether a court order might be needed. These in-
99. Baron, supra note 98, at 349-50 (1979).
100. Id. at 353.
101. Saikewicz, 337 Mass. at 758, 370 N.E.2d at 434.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 759, 370 N.E.2d at 435.
104. In re Spring, 380 Mass. at 636-39, 405 N.E.2d at 120-22.
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cluded, inter alia, the extent of the patient's mental impair-
ment, whether the patient is in the custody of a state institution,
the prognosis with and without treatment, the risk of the pro-
posed treatment, side effects, and urgency of decision. 10 5 How-
ever, the court was not specific about which combination of cir-
cumstances would make prior court approval necessary.106 Thus,
the court left considerable confusion by failing to articulate
clearly when judicial involvement is required.
The court felt strongly that private medical decisions must
be made responsibly and would be subject to judicial scrutiny if
good faith or due care were questioned in subsequent litiga-
tion. 0 7 Furthermore, once a court is properly presented with the
legal question of whether treatment may be withheld, it cannot
delegate that decision but must decide that question itself.108
In In re Storar,0 9 the New York Court of Appeals held that
judicial involvement in treatment decisions was optional, not
mandatory. The court recognized that those charged with the
care of incompetents may want to apply to the courts for a rul-
ing on the propriety of a proposed decision to discontinue life-
sustaining treatment before making such a decision, but that
such a procedure was not required. 10
One commentator points out the advantages in allowing
courts to decide when to discontinue lifesaving treatment for in-
competent terminally ill patients. These advantages are as fol-
lows: 1) the public nature of judicial proceedings, 2) the require-
ment that a judge's decision be principled, 3) the impartiality of
the decisionmaker, and 4) the adversarial nature of the judicial
proceedings." 1 "Perhaps the greatest virtue of a decision-making
process that possesses the four features listed above is that it
provides a framework for ongoing criticism and revision both of
particular decisions and of the decision-making process itself." 2
Another commentator contends:
105. Id. at 637, 405 N.E.2d at 121.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 639, 405 N.E.2d at 122.
108. Id.
109. 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266 (1981).
110. Id. at 382, 420 N.E.2d at 74, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 276.
111. Baron, supra note 98, at 347-49.
112. Buchanan, supra note 98, at 107.
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[w]ithout judicial scrutiny, it is impossible to determine
whether family members or physicians are acting in accor-
dance with appropriate standards in making a decision
which will terminate the life of another. Although the judi-
cial process is somewhat awkward for parties who must con-
front a formal mechanism at a time of great emotional
stress, the courts should make the judgment in the most dif-
ficult of withholding of treatment situations because of their
neutrality.'1 3
Finally, the courts must always continue to play a role in the
decisionmaking for congenital incompetents housed in state
facilities.
Having the judicial system act as decisionmaker in cases re-
quiring life-sustaining treatment has its disadvantages. One
practical disadvantage is the "slow grinding of the wheels of jus-
tice.""1 4 Many patients whose fates were argued and decided in
the courts died long before those decisions were handed down. 1 5
One critic has also indicated that routine court involvement in-
trudes on sound medical practice. " 6 "The courts cannot be ex-
pected to exercise sound judgment when the moral issues are so
intertwined with complex medical considerations, nor can they
act promptly and flexibly enough to meet the rapidly changing
needs of clinical situations."'1 7
The highest courts of four states " have rejected the judi-
cial forum for the resolution of controversies related to declining
lifesaving treatment. Furthermore, the New York Court of Ap-
peals, while not rejecting or encouraging the use of the courts in
right-to-die cases, has deemed their involvement "optional.""'
Most recently the Florida Supreme Court, in Bludworth, found
judicial involvement in these cases unnecessary and that the in-
113. Brant, Last Rights: An Analysis of Refusal and Withholding of Treatment
Cases, 46 Mo. L. REV. 337, 354 (1981).
114. Chapman, supra note 52, at 959.
115. Saikewicz, Spring, Fox, Storar, and Perlmutter all died before the judicial pro-
cedure had run its course.
116. Relman, supra note 93, at 237-40.
117. Id. at 240.
118. Severns v. Wilmington Medical Center, Inc., 421 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1980); John F.
Kennedy Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921 (Fla. 1984); In re Quinlan,
70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976); and In re Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d 114, 660 P.2d 738 (1983).
119. In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d at 382, 420 N.E.2d at 74, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 276.
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competent's right may be exercised by either a close family
member or a guardian.120
C. Right to Withdraw or Withhold Artificial Nourishment
Two intermediate appellate courts have addressed the con-
troversial issue of withholding or withdrawing artificial feeding
and fluids. Each has approved the withholding or withdrawing of
artificial nourishment in very limited circumstances.
In Barber v. Superior Court,'2' the California Court of Ap-
peal in a unanimous decision dismissed a murder charge against
two California physicians who, at the request of the family, had
removed first the respirator and then the intravenous feeding
tubes of a patient they judged to be hopelessly comatose. 12 The
patient, a fifty-five year old husband and father, underwent suc-
cessful surgery for an ileostomy repair. 123 Shortly thereafter,
while in the recovery room, he suffered cardio-respiratory arrest,
was resuscitated and immediately placed on a respirator. 12' Sub-
sequent tests and examinations revealed that he had suffered se-
vere brain damage, leaving him in a vegetative state with an ex-
tremely poor prognosis for recovery. 125 The patient's family
requested that all life-sustaining equipment be removed. 126 After
the respirator was disconnected, the patient began breathing on
his own but showed no signs of improvement. 127 Two days later,
at the further request of the family, the intravenous tubes which
provided hydration and nourishment were removed. Six days
later the patient died. 2 '
Subsequently, a hospital employee brought the incident to
the attention of the district attorney and it was determined that
the patient had died of dehydration. The doctors were then
charged with murder and conspiracy to commit murder.129
120. Bludworth, 452 So. 2d at 926.
121. 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484 (1983).
122. Id.
123. Id. at 1010, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 486.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 1011, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 486.
129. Id.
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In rendering its decision, the court acknowledged that the
current gap between the law and advances in medical technology
had forced physicians and families to make intensely painful de-
cisions without clearly defined guidelines. 130 The court realized
that it was the province of the legislature to provide a long-term
solution to the complex problems confronting them in cases such
as this. Nevertheless, the court recognized the need to pass judg-
ment on the physicians' conduct and the related issues so as to
provide guidelines of a general nature for future conduct in the
absence of such legislation. 131
This case represents the first time an appellate court
equated the discontinuation of intravenous nourishment with
the removal of a respirator. The court declared that the adminis-
tration of intravenous nourishment and fluid was equivalent to
the use of the respirator or other form of life support equip-
ment.13 2 Each is a medical treatment to be administered only as
long as it is of reasonable benefit to the patient and improves
the prognosis for recovery. "There is no duty to continue [to
provide medical treatment or life-sustaining machinery] once it
has become futile in the opinion of qualified medical person-
nel. 133 Thus, when such intervention merely sustains the biolog-
ical functions and does not improve the prognosis for recovery, it
may be discontinued without concern for criminal liability. Since
the court found artificial feeding to be equivalent to medical
care, it prohibited the lower court from taking any criminal ac-
tion against the physicians responsible for removal of the pa-
tient's feeding tubes.
In In re Hier,134 the Appeals Court of Massachusetts, citing
Barber, ruled that a ninety-two year old incompetent patient
need not undergo surgery to reinsert a gastrotomy tube. The pa-
tient, a severely retarded mentally ill woman, had been a patient
for fifty-seven years at a psychiatric hospital before being trans-
ferred to a nursing home in 1983.111 The combined effect of all
130. Id. at 1014, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 488.
131. Id. at 1014, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 488-89.
132. Id. at 1016, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 490.
133. Id. at 1018, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 491.
134. 464 N.E.2d 959 (Mass. App. Ct.), review denied, 392 Mass. 1101, 465 N.E.2d
261 (1984).
135. Id. at 960.
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her medical ailments was to greatly impede her ability to ingest
food orally.13 While hospitalized in 1974, she received a gastrot-
omy - a surgical implantation of a feeding tube directly
through the abdominal wall into her stomach.'37 She repeatedly
pulled out the tube.138 Reinsertion was possible without surgery
but only if that insertion was accomplished within a relatively
short time.13 9 Otherwise, reinsertion required open abdominal
surgery. Multiple abdominal scars indicated that several surgical
procedures had been performed to reinsert her gastrotomy
tube.'4 o
In early 1984, when the patient was transferred to a hospital
because of difficulties encountered in replacing the tube, she re-
fused to allow reinsertion and soon required another abdominal
operation.'" The patient refused to consent to the surgery. 42 A
guardian was appointed to obtain court authorization to admin-
ister medication as well as to consent to the surgery.143
The lower court applied the "substituted judgment" stan-
dard as in Saikewicz, the goal of which is to determine with as
much accuracy as possible the wants and needs of the incapaci-
tated person. 44 The court held that the patient need not un-
dergo the surgery necessary to reinsert the tube, having deter-
mined that the patient, if competent to make the decision for
herself, "would reject all the several forms of surgical interven-
tion which might enable adequate nutritional support."' 45
The Massachusetts Appeals Court affirmed the lower court
judgment, even though it recognized that the intravenous feed-
ing the patient was receiving as her sole source of nutrition and
hydration was "useful as a short term technique only and mainly
for hydration rather than as a source of an adequate and bal-
anced diet.' 46 The court rejected the argument of the guardian
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 961.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. See supra text accompanying notes 54-56.
145. In re Hier, 464 N.E.2d at 961.
146. Id.
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ad litem that nutrition should be differentiated from treatment
and that the right of choice be confined to treatment deci-
sions. 47 Rather, it found more plausible the contention that
"[m]edical procedures to provide nutrition ... [were] more simi-
lar to other medical procedures than to typical human ways of
providing nutrition .... It should be possible to evaluate their
benefits and burdens, as we evaluate any other medical
procedure.' 1 48
The court noted that its decision was qualitatively different
from Barber because it was not addressing the issue of whether
to terminate ongoing nutritional support. "Here the issue [was]
whether to put an unwilling patient through a major surgical
procedure in order to provide adequate nutritional support
which [was] not possible through the ongoing intravenous
feeding.' 49
III. In re Conroy
A. The Facts
Claire Conroy was an eighty-four year old nursing home res-
ident who suffered from serious and irreversible physical and
mental impairments, including arteriosclerotic heart disease, di-
abetes, hypertension and a gangrenous leg. 150 She had a urinary
catheter and no bowel control.' 5' She could not speak and her
ability to swallow was very limited.12 She was fed and medi-
cated through a nasogastric tube.15 3 Her movements were very
limited although she could smile or moan in response to some
stimuli.154 She was not brain dead, comatose, or in a chronic veg-
etative state. 5 5 Medical evidence was inconclusive as to whether
147. Id. at 964.
148. Id. (quoting Lynn & Childress, Must Patients Always Be Given Food and
Water?, 13 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 17, 20 (1983)).
149. Id.
150. In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 337, 486 A.2d 1209, 1217 (1985).
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. A nasogastric tube extends from the nose through the esophagus to the
stomach.
154. Id.
155. Id.
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or not she experienced pain.1 56
Thomas Whittemore, Conroy's nephew and only living
blood relative, had been appointed her guardian before she en-
tered the nursing home.157 He had known her for over fifty years
and had visited her weekly for four or five years before she en-
tered the nursing home. The court found that Conroy's interest
was the nephew's only concern. 158 He had good intentions and
no real conflict of interest due to possible inheritance.1 59 He
sought court permission to remove her nasogastric tube because
he believed she would not have permitted its insertion in the
first place if she had had the choice.16 0
She was expected to die within a year if nasogastric feeding
were continued. If the tube were removed, physicians concurred
that she would die of dehydration within a week and that such a
death might be painful."6 Hospital physicians disagreed as to
whether or not the tube should be removed.6 2
B. Lower Court Opinions
The trial court granted the guardian permission to remove
the feeding tube because the patient's life had become impossi-
bly and permanently burdensome for her and her intellectual
functioning had become irreversibly reduced to an extremely
primitive level.163 In such circumstances, the court noted that
prolonging life becomes pointless and perhaps cruel.6
The trial court decision was appealed by the guardian ad
litem but Conroy died while the appeal was pending - her
nasogastric tube intact. The appellate division, nevertheless,
considered the issue to be of too much public importance not to
be resolved. 65 The court found that this type of case was capa-
156. Id. at 338, 486 A.2d at 1217.
157. Id. at 339, 486 A.2d at 1218.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 340, 486 A.2d at 1218.
161. Id. at 338, 486 A.2d at 1217.
162. Id. at 338-39, 486 A.2d at 1217-18.
163. In re Conroy, 188 N.J. Super. 523, 457 A.2d 1232 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div.),
rev'd, 190 N.J. Super. 453, 464 A.2d (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1983), rev'd, 98 N.J. 321,
486 A.2d 1209 (1985).
164. Id. at 528, 457 A.2d at 1235.
165. In re Conroy, 190 N.J. Super. 453, 459-60, 464 A.2d 303, 306 (N.J. Super. Ct.
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ble of repetition but would evade review because the patients
involved frequently die during the litigation.166 It reversed the
trial court, holding that the right to terminate treatment was
limited to "incurabl[y] and terminally ill patients who are brain
dead, irreversibly comatose or vegetative and who would gain no
medical benefit from continued treatment." ' The court con-
cluded that withdrawal of the feeding tube would be tantamount
to killing the patient.16 It determined that withholding nourish-
ment from a patient in Conroy's condition would hasten death
rather than simply allow an illness to take its natural course.169
The court held as an alternative ground for its decision that ar-
tificial nourishment and hydration were not medical treatments
that could be refused by a third party.17 0 That is, a guardian's
decision may never be used to withhold nourishment from an
incompetent patient who is not comatose, brain dead, or vegeta-
tive, and whose death is not irreversibly imminent.
1
Conroy's guardian, Whittemore, petitioned the New Jersey
Supreme Court for certification.
C. Opinion of the New Jersey Supreme Court
1. The Majority
The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed the decision of the
appellate division and declared that life-sustaining treatment,
including artificial nourishment and hydration, may be withheld
or withdrawn from incompetent, institutionalized, elderly pa-
tients with severe and permanent mental and physical impair-
ments and a limited life expectancy under detailed judicial
guidelines.17 2 Writing for the majority, Justice Schreiber recog-
nized that a "tragic situation like that of Claire Conroy raises
profoundly disturbing questions" that involve the interplay of
App. Div. 1983), rev'd, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985).
166. Id. See supra note 115.
167. In re Conroy, 190 N.J. Super. 453, 466, 464 A.2d 303, 310 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1983).
168. Id. at 475, 464 A.2d at 315.
169. Id. at 473, 464 A.2d at 314.
170. Id. at 469-70, 464 A.2d at 311-12.
171. Id.
172. See infra text accompanying notes 194-216 for the three court devised tests for
determining when life-sustaining treatment may be withdrawn or withheld.
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many disciplines, questions that do not lend themselves to ideal
solutions.'73 The court suggested that the legislature may be bet-
ter equipped to formulate clear standards for resolving requests
to terminate life-sustaining treatment for incompetent pa-
tients.'17' However, in the absence of any such specific legislation,
the court acknowledged its obligation to resolve the issue before
it so as to "place appropriate constraints on such private deci-
sion-making and to create guideposts that will help protect peo-
ple's interests in determining the course of their own lives.' 75
The court began its analysis of whether life-sustaining treat-
ment may be withheld or withdrawn from an incompetent pa-
tient with an examination of the rights of a competent patient
with respect to accepting or rejecting medical care.'17 The court
acknowledged that the right to make certain decisions concern-
ing one's body is protected by the federal constitutional right of
privacy.1 77 It noted that while the right of privacy might apply
in the instant case, it need not decide that issue since the right
of a competent adult to decline medical treatment is embraced
within the common law right to self-determination. 78 Through
the doctrine of informed consent, a competent adult generally
has the right to refuse the initiation or continuation of any med-
ical treatment. 79
The court recognized, however, that the right to decline life-
sustaining treatment may yield to countervailing societal inter-
ests in sustaining the person's life. 8 ' The court balanced the
right to refuse treatment against state interests in the preserva-
tion of life,18' the prevention of suicide, 82 the maintenance of
the ethical integrity of the medical profession'8 3 and the protec-
173. In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 343, 486 A.2d 1209, 1220 (1985).
174. Id. at 344, 486 A.2d at 1220.
175. Id. at 345, 486 A.2d at 1221.
176. Id. at 346, 486 A.2d at 1221.
177. Id. at 348, 486 A.2d at 1222.
178. Id. at 348, 486 A.2d at 1223.
179. Id. at 347, 486 A.2d at 1222.
180. Id. at 348-49, 486 A.2d at 1223. See supra text accompanying notes 23-37.
181. In re Conroy, 98 N.J. at 349, 486 A.2d at 1223. See supra text accompanying
notes 24-28.
182. In re Conroy, 98 N.J. at 350, 486 A.2d at 1224. See supra text accompanying
notes 29-30.
183. In re Conroy, 98 N.J. at 351-52, 486 A.2d at 1224-25. See supra text accompa-
nying notes 33-35.
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tion of innocent third parties. 8 " None was found sufficiently
compelling to prevent the removal of life-sustaining apparatus in
the instant case. On balance, the court concluded that "the right
to self-determination ordinarily outweighs any countervailing
state interests."1 85
The majority then discussed the rights of an incompetent
patient, acknowledging that in attempting to exercise an incom-
petent person's right to accept or refuse medical treatment,
"substitute decisionmakers must seek to respect simultaneously
both aspects of the patient's right to self-determination - the
right to live, and the right, in some cases, to die of natural
causes without medical intervention.' ' 86 In re Quinlan was
deemed the appropriate starting point for a discussion of with-
holding or withdrawing life-sustaining treatment from an incom-
petent person. This same New Jersey Supreme Court, in Quin-
lan, approved the designation of the father as guardian and
authorized that the respirator could be removed as long as the
family, the attending physicians, and an ethics committee con-
curred "that there [was] no reasonable possibility of Karen's
ever emerging from her present comatose condition to a cogni-
tive, sapient state.' 87
Although Quinlan focused on patients in a chronic, persis-
tent vegetative or comatose state,188 the court left open the ques-
tion of whether the decision could be applied to incompetent pa-
tients in "other types of terminal medical situations . . . , not
necessarily involving the hopeless loss of cognitive or sapient
life."' 89 Conroy represents just such a situation - "elderly, for-
merly competent nursing home residents who, unlike Karen
Quinlan, are awake and conscious and can interact with their
environment to a limited extent, but whose mental and physical
functioning is severely and permanently impaired and whose life
184. In re Conroy, 98 N.J. at 353, 486 A.2d at 1225. See supra text accompanying
notes 31-32.
185. In re Conroy, 98 N.J. at 353, 486 A.2d at 1225.
186. Id. at 356, 486 A.2d at 1227.
187. Id. at 357-58, 486 A.2d at 1227-28 (quoting In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 55, 355
A.2d 647, 671, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976)).
188. Id. at 358-59, 486 A.2d at 1228.
189. Id. at 359, 486 A.2d at 1228 (quoting In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 54 n.10, 355
A.2d 647, 671 n.10 (1976)).
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expectancy, even with the treatment, is relatively short."' 90 The
Conroy court found that incompetent patients retain the right to
self-determination.' 9' "The right of an adult who, like Claire
Conroy, was once competent, to determine the course of her
medical treatment remains intact even when she is no longer
able to assert that right or to appreciate its effectuation.1' 9 2
Therefore, the goal of a substitute decisionmaker should be to
attempt to effectuate whatever decision the patient would have
made if competent. 193
The New Jersey court delineated three separate standards
or tests under which a decision can be made for patients like
Claire Conroy so that they need not be required to have life-
sustaining treatment. The first standard reflects the subjective
considerations of "substituted judgment," whereas the other two
reflect some of the objective considerations of the "best inter-
ests" test. 94
Under the subjective standard, the question is what the par-
ticular patient would have done if able to choose for himself and
not what a reasonable person would have chosen to do under the
circumstances.' 95 The court articulated its version of substituted
judgment by holding that
life-sustaining treatment may be withheld or withdrawn
from an incompetent patient when it is clear that the partic-
ular patient would have refused the treatment under the cir-
cumstances involved. The standard we are enunciating is a
subjective one, consistent with the notion that the right that
we are seeking to effectuate is a very personal right to con-
trol one's own life.' 96
The court enumerated the types of evidence bearing on the
patient's intent not to have lifesaving medical intervention that
may be considered in determining the course of treatment. Evi-
dence of refusal may be found in "living wills"'' 97 stating the per-
190. Id. at 359, 486 A.2d at 1228-29.
191. Id. at 359, 486 A.2d at 1229.
192. Id. at 359-60, 486 A.2d at 1229.
193. Id. at 360, 486 A.2d at 1229.
194. Id. at 321, 486 A.2d at 1209.
195. Id. at 360-61, 486 A.2d at 1229.
196. Id. at 360, 486 A.2d at 1229.
197. Id. at 361, 486 A.2d at 1229.
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son's desire not to be treated or sustained under certain circum-
stances; in an oral directive 9 " to a family member, friend or
health care provider; or in a durable power of attorney 99 or ap-
pointment of a proxy 00 authorizing a particular person to make
decisions on the patient's behalf. A patient's reaction with re-
gard to medical treatment administered to others may serve as
evidence of refusal.2 0 ' Evidence of refusal may also be deduced
from the person's religious beliefs202 or consistent pattern of
conduct with respect to prior decisions about his own medical
care.
2 0 3
The court noted that the probative value of such evidence
may vary depending on the maturity of the person at the time of
his statements or actions and the remoteness, consistency,
thoughtfulness and specificity of these prior statements or ac-
tions.2 04 The court limited the application of this standard to
patients within the "Claire Conroy pattern '20 5 - "elderly, in-
competent nursing-home resident[s] with severe and permanent
mental and physical impairments and a life expectancy of ap-
proximately one year or less. '206
The second and third standards delineated by the court
would be used in the absence of adequate proof of the patient's
wishes because in those cases it would be "naive to pretend that
the right to self-determination serves as the basis for substituted
decision-making. '20 7 The court adopted narrow versions of the
best interest standard in order not to foreclose the possibility of
terminating life-sustaining treatment for persons who never
clearly made their wishes known but are now "suffering a pro-
longed and painful death. '20 8 The court held that "life-sus-
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 361, 486 A.2d at 1230.
201. Id. The court acknowledged that it had erred in Quinlan in not considering
Karen Quinlan's own statements to friends in its attempt to assess her wishes. Id. at 362,
486 A.2d at 1230.
202. Id. at 361-62, 486 A.2d at 1230.
203. Id at 362, 486 A.2d at 1230.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 363, 486 A.2d at 1231.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 364, 486 A.2d at 1231. See also In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 378-80, 420
N.E.2d 64, 72-73, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, 274-75, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981).
208. In re Conroy, 98 N.J. at 364, 486 A.2d at 1231.
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taining treatment may also be withheld or withdrawn from a pa-
tient in Claire Conroy's situation if either of two 'best interests'
tests - a limited-objective or a pure-objective test - is
satisfied. 20 9
The limited-objective test could be invoked to withhold or
withdraw life-sustaining treatment when there is "some trust-
worthy evidence that the patient would have refused the treat-
ment, and ... it is clear that the burdens of the patient's contin-
ued life with the treatment outweigh the benefits of that life for
him."21 0 This standard would allow termination of treatment for
a patient when it is clear that the treatment in question would
merely prolong the patient's suffering and when the patient had
not unequivocally expressed his desires while competent.211
When there is no reliable or trustworthy evidence of the pa-
tient's wishes, life-sustaining treatment may still be withheld or
withdrawn from a patient like Conroy under a third set of crite-
ria - the pure-objective test. Under this test, life-sustaining
treatment should be withdrawn or withheld only when
the net burdens of the patient's life with the treatment...
clearly and markedly outweigh the benefits that the patient
derives from life. Further, the recurring, unavoidable and se-
vere pain of the patient's life with the treatment should be
such that the effect of administering life-sustaining treat-
ment would be inhumane.22
Thus, under the limited-objective and pure-objective tests,
the New Jersey court restricted evaluation of a patient's life in
terms of "pain, suffering, and possible enjoyment.12 1 The court
believed that "[w]hen evidence of a person's wishes or physical
or mental condition is equivocal, it is best to err, if at all, in
favor of preserving life."21" Furthermore, the court expressly re-
fused to authorize decisionmaking based on assessments of the
personal worth or social utility of another's life, or the value of
that life to others2 15 because such an authorization "would cre-
209. Id. at 365, 486 A.2d at 1231-32.
210. Id. at 365, 486 A.2d at 1232.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 366, 486 A.2d at 1232.
213. Id. at 367, 486 A.2d at 1232.
214. Id. at 368, 486 A.2d at 1233.
215. Id. at 367, 486 A.2d at 1232-33.
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ate an intolerable risk for socially isolated and defenseless peo-
ple suffering from physical or mental handicaps.""2 6
The court emphasized that in making these decisions for in-
competent patients, the primary focus should be on the patient's
desires and on the experience of pain and enjoyment, not on the
type of treatment involved.21 7 In the context of legal analysis
and decisionmaking, the court examined and rejected any at-
tempt to distinguish between actively hastening death by termi-
nating treatment and passively allowing a person to die of a
disease.2 18 Similarly, it rejected any distinction between with-
holding and withdrawing life-sustaining treatment." 9 It also
found unpersuasive the distinction between ordinary and ex-
traordinary treatment except insofar as the particular patient
would have made the distinction.22 0 Finally, the court rejected
any distinction between artificial feeding and other medical
treatment.21 Analytically, the court concluded that artificial
feeding by means of a nasogastric tube or intravenous infusion
was equivalent to artificial breathing by a respirator.222 Both are
medical treatments, prolonging life through mechanical means
when the body, on its own, is no longer able to perform vital
functions.2 23 Thus, on the condition that there is sufficient proof
to satisfy the subjective, limited-objective, or pure-objective test,
the withdrawal or withholding of artificial nourishment, like any
other medical treatment, would be permissible.2 4
Finally, the court tackled the decisionmaking procedure,
well aware of the particular vulnerability of nursing home resi-
dents. The court used as its framework the 1983 amendment to
New Jersey's Elderly Abuse Statute which charges the Office of
the Ombudsman for the Institutionalized Elderly to guard
against "abuse" of such elderly patients." "The new provisions
regarding abuse of the elderly create a vehicle for safeguarding
216. Id. at 367, 486 A.2d at 1233.
217. Id. at 369, 486 A.2d at 1233.
218. Id. at 369, 486 A.2d at 1233-34.
219. Id. at 369, 486 A.2d at 1234.
220. Id. at 370, 486 A.2d at 1234-35.
221. Id. at 372, 486 A.2d at 1235.
222. Id. at 373, 486 A.2d at 1236.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 374, 486 A.2d at 1236.
225. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27G (West 1985).
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the rights of elderly, institutionalized, incompetent patients
both to receive medical treatment and to refuse life-sustaining
medical treatment under certain circumstances.
2 2 6
The majority requires that the following strict procedures
be adhered to before life-sustaining treatment may be with-
drawn from an incompetent nursing home patient. There must
be a judicial determination that the patient is in fact incompe-
tent to make the medical decision at issue; if so, a guardian is
appointed to make the decision.2 7 Anyone believing that the
withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment would ei-
ther effectuate the incompetent's wishes or would be in his or
her "best interests" should notify the Office of the
Ombudsman. 228 Likewise, anyone who has reasonable cause to
suspect that any such action would be an abuse should report
that information to the ombudsman.229
The ombudsman must treat every notification as a potential
"abuse" and is required to investigate the situation immedi-
ately.230 As part of his investigation, the ombudsman must ob-
tain information about the patient's condition from the attend-
ing physicians and nurses; he should then appoint two other
physicians who are unaffiliated with the nursing home to con-
firm the patient's medical condition and prognosis. 231 Using this
medical information, the guardian, with the concurrence of the
attending physician and ombudsman, "may withhold or with-
draw life-sustaining medical treatment if he believes in good
faith, based on the medical evidence and any evidence of the
patient's wishes," that one of the three court-delineated stan-
dards is met.232 Furthermore, in the absence of bad faith, all
participants in the decisionmaking process are immune from
civil or criminal liability.2 33
The majority stressed the narrowness of its decision, which
is restricted to nursing home residents like Claire Conroy who
226. In re Conroy, 98 N.J. at 379, 486 A.2d at 1239.
227. Id. at 381, 486 A.2d at 1240.
228. Id. at 383, 486 A.2d at 1241.
229. Id. at 383, 486 A.2d at 1241-42.
230. Id. at 383-84, 486 A.2d at 1242.
231. Id. at 384, 486 A.2d at 1242.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 385, 486 A.2d at 1242.
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are "suffering from serious and permanent mental and physical
impairments, who will probably die within approximately one
year even with treatment, and who, though formerly competent,
[are] now incompetent to make decisions about [their] life-sus-
taining treatment and [are] unlikely to regain such compe-
tence. 12 34 In concluding, the court determined that the record in
the instant case was not adequate to satisfy any of the standards
it had set forth - the subjective, the limited-objective, or the
pure-objective. 35 Were Claire Conroy still alive, the guardian
would have to address, these issues before reaching any
decision.23 6
2. Concurrence in Part, Dissent in Part
Only Justice Handler dissented in part, criticizing the
court's emphasis on pain as the sole criterion for determining
the best interests of people like Claire Conroy.2 3 According to
Justice Handler, the application of either the limited-objective
or pure-objective test "would not have led to a more humane,
dignified, and decent end of Claire Conroy's mortal life. She
would have died, as she did, with the nasogastric tube still in her
body.123 8 The dissent found that the majority's concentration on
pain as the exclusive criterion in making life-or-death decisions
"transmutes the best-interests determination into an exercise of
avoidance and nullification rather than confrontation and fulfill-
ment."2 39 Handler cited the President's Commission Report as
additional support for rejecting an exclusive focus on patient
pain.2 40
Justice Handler suggests that the standard should not focus
"exclusively on pain as the ultimately determinative criterion.
Rather, the standard should consist of an array of factors to be
medically established and then evaluated by the decision-maker
both singly and collectively to reach a balance that will justify
234. Id. at 342, 486 A.2d at 1219-20.
235. Id. at 387, 486 A.2d at 1243.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 392, 486 A.2d at 1247.
238. Id. at 391, 486 A.2d at 1246.
239. Id. at 394, 486 A.2d at 1247.
240. Id. at 396, 486 A.2d at 1248 (quoting PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION REPORT, supra
note 48, at 135).
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the determination whether to withdraw or to continue life-pro-
longing treatment."2 1 Those factors are then enumerated in the
opinion." 2
In his conclusion, Justice Handler reflects that "[w]hen
cherished values of human dignity and personal privacy, which
belong to every person living or dying, are sufficiently trans-
gressed by what is being done to the individual, we should be
ready to say: enough. '243 According to one commentator, Justice
Handler would have gone further than the majority
by allowing removal or withholding of life support, including
nutrition and hydration, on the basis of a 'best interests' de-
termination, without the stricter qualifications in regard to
pain and suffering. The result, therefore, is a strong position
and a firm consensus of the court on the basic philosophy to
allow termination of life support in stated circumstances. 44
IV. Analysis
In re Conroy represents the New Jersey Supreme Court's
most recent struggle with life-and-death decisions concerning
withholding or withdrawing life-sustaining therapy from incom-
petent patients. On the one hand, there is the desire to effectu-
ate the substantive right of all persons - both competent and
incompetent - to bodily integrity and self-determination. On
the other hand, there is the need to act cautiously and deliber-
ately so that incompetent patients are protected against "deci-
sions that make death too easy and quick as well as from those
241. Id. at 397, 486 A.2d at 1249.
242. The factors enumerated by the court were as follows:
The person should be terminally ill and facing imminent death. There should
also be present the permanent loss of conscious thought processes in the form of a
comatose state or profound unconsciousness. Further, there should be the irrepa-
rable failure of at least one major and essential bodily organ or system .... Obvi-
ously the presence or absence of significant pain is highly relevant. In addition,
the person's general physical condition must be of great concern. The presence of
progressive, irreversible, extensive, and extreme physical deterioration, such as ul-
cers, lesions, gangrene, infection, incontinence and the like, which frequently af-
flict the bed-ridden, terminally ill, should be considered in the formulation of an
appropriate standard.
Id. at 398, 486 A.2d at 1249 (citations omitted).
243. Id. at 399, 486 A.2d at 1250.
244. Curran, Defining Appropriate Medical Care: Providing Nutrients and Hydra-
tion for the Dying, 313 NEw ENG. J. MED. 940, 942 (1985).
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that make it too agonizing and prolonged."246 In one of the most
far-reaching right-to-die decisions ever rendered, the New Jersey
court addressed the obligation to provide artificial nourishment
and fluids to elderly nursing home residents who are greatly im-
paired and dying. The Conroy decision demonstrates both com-
passion for the rights of elderly incompetent patients as well as
a keen awareness of the staggering potential for abuse.
A. More Than One Standard for the Decisionmaker
Most courts have been guided by a single standard or test in
surrogate decisionmaking for incompetent patients - usually
either the subjective "substituted judgment" test2 ' 6 or the objec-
tive "best interests" test. 47 Conroy represents a significant step
forward in this respect in that the court delineated three sepa-
rate standards in its attempt to effectuate the rights of the in-
competent patient: one subjective substituted judgment stan-
dard and two objective best interests tests.
Under the subjective standard, the court held that life-sus-
taining treatment may be withheld or withdrawn from an incom-
petent patient like Claire Conroy when it is clear that the pa-
tient would have refused the treatment under the
circumstances.2 48 The court should be congratulated for recog-
nizing that the substituted judgment standard should only be
applied to patients who were once competent and had at that
time unequivocally expressed their preferences with respect to
artificial life-sustaining treatment.24 9 This is in contradistinction
245. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 48, at 23.
246. See supra text accompanying notes 48-56.
247. See supra text accompanying notes 57-63.
248. In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 360, 486 A.2d 1209, 1229 (1985).
249. For the types of evidence bearing on the patient's intent that may be consid-
ered in determining the course of treatment, see supra text accompanying notes 197-205.
See also supra text accompanying note 207.
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to Saikewicz2 50 and Spring251 where the courts purported to
make substituted judgments for their respective incompetent
patients but where, in fact, there was no basis for the applica-
tion of the standard. Joseph Saikewicz was a congenital incom-
petent, profoundly retarded his entire life; the use of substituted
judgment in deciding to forego his chemotherapy treatments was
a deceptive fiction.25 2 Likewise with Earle Spring, for whom
there was virtually no evidence of whether he would have de-
clined dialysis treatments had he been competent, the applica-
tion of a substituted judgment test was inapposite.
For those nursing home residents who have not unequivo-
cally expressed a preference about life-sustaining treatment but
for whom there is "some trustworthy evidence that the patient
would have refused the treatment, 2 53 the court would apply the
limited-objective test. That is, the decisionmaker would have to
balance the "burdens of treatment to the patient in terms of
pain and suffering" against the "benefits that the patient is ex-
periencing. ' 25 4 What this means is:
that the patient is suffering, and will continue to suffer
throughout the expected duration of his life, unavoidable
pain, and that the net burdens of his prolonged life (the
pain and suffering of his life with the treatment less the
amount and duration of pain that the patient would likely
experience if the treatment were withdrawn) markedly out-
weigh any physical pleasure, emotional enjoyment, or intel-
lectual satisfaction that the patient may still be able to de-
rive from life.255
Finally, for those nursing home residents for whom there is
no available evidence concerning their prior views about refusing
life-sustaining treatment, the court would look to the pure-ob-
jective test. Under this test, a far stricter standard of the pa-
tient's unbearable life would have to be shown; this test requires
250. Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370
N.E.2d 417 (1977).
251. In re Spring, 380 Mass. 629, 405 N.E.2d 115 (1980).
252. See Chapman, supra note 52 at 938. See also supra text accompanying notes
60-61.
253. In re Conroy, 98 N.J. at 365, 486 A.2d at 1232.
254. Id. at 365-66, 486 A.2d at 1232.
255. Id. at 365, 486 A.2d at 1232 (emphasis added).
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"recurring, unavoidable and severe pain '2 56 before treatment
could be terminated.
Although the court extended the criteria for decisionmaking
to three separate tests, thereby adopting both subjective and ob-
jective criteria for decisionmaking, it did so on very narrow
grounds. Evaluation of a patient's condition under both objec-
tive tests is limited to "terms of pain, suffering and possible
enjoyment. 2 57
B. Is Pain the Only Criterion for Treatment Refusal or
Withdrawal?
The majority's best interests tests are severely restricted,
particularly when compared with the broadly defined best inter-
ests of the President's Commission Report which takes into ac-
count not only the relief of suffering but also such factors as
"the preservation or restoration of functioning, and the quality
as well as the extent of life sustained. '258 The Conroy court re-
jects the criteria of the President's Commission for fear of creat-
ing an "intolerable risk for socially isolated and defenseless peo-
ple suffering from physical or mental handicaps. 2 59 The
majority believes that "[w]hen evidence of a person's wishes or
physical or mental condition is equivocal, it is best to err, if at
all, in favor of preserving life. 260
The court expressly declined to authorize decisionmaking
based on "assessments of the personal worth or social utility of
another's life, or of the value of that life to others. ' '" 2 1 This not-
withstanding, it would seem that the court could somehow have
established verifiable measures for a standard to withhold or
withdraw life support based on the quality of the patient's life.
"There is no intrinsic reason why a quality-of-life standard must
remain any more vague and undefined than a standard that in-
256. Id. at 366, 486 A.2d at 1232.
257. Id. at 367, 486 A.2d at 1232.
258. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 48, at 135. See also supra text
accompanying note 59. Furthermore, the court in Barber approved these best interest
standards. Barber v. Superior Court, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 1021, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484, 493
(1983). See also supra text accompanying notes 121-33.
259. In re Conroy, 98 N.J. at 367, 486 A.2d at 1233.
260. Id. at 368, 486 A.2d at 1233.
261. Id. at 367, 486 A.2d at 1232-33.
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cludes pain.'262
Justice Handler argued persuasively in dissent that quite
another standard should have been formulated - one that
would not give "determinative weight to the element of personal
pain, which necessarily obviates other extremely important con-
siderations. '"63 He contended that the standard should accom-
modate as comprehensively, fairly, and realistically as possible
"all concerns and values that have a legitimate bearing on the
decision whether to provide particular treatment at the very end
of an individual's life. ' '264
Several important criteria bear on this critical determina-
tion. The person should be terminally ill and facing immi-
nent death. There should also be present the permanent loss
of conscious thought processes in the form of a comatose
state or profound unconsciousness. Further, there should be
the irreparable failure of at least one major and essential
bodily organ or system.2 65
The necessity of proving pain and suffering is inappropriate
in these already unfortunate situations. The focus on pain as the
only basis for withholding or withdrawing treatment is too nar-
row. It would be an absolute bar to the withdrawal of life sup-
port therapy for those patients who do not experience pain;266
for those situations where health care providers are unable to
evaluate the degree of pain, if any, experienced by an incompe-
tent patient;21 7 for those who "abhor dependence on others as
much, or more than they fear pain";2 68 for those who "value per-
sonal privacy and dignity, and prize independence from others
when their personal needs and bodily functions are involved"; 269
and for those who may have wished to avoid "the ultimate hor-
ror [not of] death but the possibility of being maintained in
limbo, in a sterile room, by machines controlled by strangers. "270
262. Id. at 397, 486 A.2d at 1249 (Handler, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
263. Id. at 392, 486 A.2d at 1246.
264. Id.
265. Id. at 398, 486 A.2d at 1249.
266. Id. at 394, 486 A.2d at 1247.
267. Id. at 394-95, 486 A.2d at 1247.
268. Id. at 396, 486 A.2d at 1248.
269. Id. at 396, 486 A.2d at 1248.
270. Id. at 396, 486 A.2d at 1248 (quoting Steel, The Right to Die: New Options in
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The standard articulated by Justice Handler would properly
consider "an array of factors to be medically established and
then evaluated by the decision-maker both singly and collec-
tively to reach a balance that will justify the determination
whether to withdraw or to continue life-prolonging
treatment.
'2 71
C. Artificial Nourishment Viewed as Medical Treatment
The court was emphatic in its concern that the primary fo-
cus of decisionmaking in cases related to withholding or with-
drawing artificial life-sustaining treatment should be the "pa-
tient's desires and experience of pain and enjoyment - not the
type of treatment. 2 72 Its examination and rejection of several
sets of semantic distinctions2 73 that have often been relied upon
by those opposed to removal of artificial life-sustaining therapies
is to be lauded; those distinctions may have only served to ob-
fuscate an already confused and unsettled decisionmaking
process.
Of utmost significiance is the court's refusal to find a dis-
tinction between termination of artificial feeding and termina-
tion of other forms of life-sustaining treatments. It appears the
court would consider such a distinction more psychologically
compelling than logically sound, particularly because of the
"emotional symbolism "274 of food. Ethicists have noted that
"people are rightly eager to provide food and water. Such provi-
sion is essential to minimally tolerable existence and a powerful
symbol of our concern for each other. '27 5
Providing artificial nourishment and hydration to a termi-
nally ill comatose patient, however, should not be confused with
California, CHRISTIAN CENTURY, July-Dec. 1976, at 93).
271. Id. at 397, 486 A.2d at 1249.
272. In re Conroy, 98 N.J. at 369, 486 A.2d at 1233.
273. The court rejected any legal distinction between actively hastening death by
terminating treatment and passively allowing a person to die; between withholding and
withdrawing life-sustaining treatment; between ordinary and extraordinary treatment;
and between artificial feeding and any other medical treatment. Id. at 369-73, 486 A.2d
at 1233-36. See also supra text accompanying notes 217-24.
274. In re Conroy, 98 N.J. at 372, 486 A.2d at 1236.
275. Lynn & Childress, Must Patients Always Be Given Food and Water?, 13 HAS-
TINGS CENTER REP. 17, 20 (1983).
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providing food and water to a starving but otherwise well per-
son. "Medical procedures to provide nutrition and hydration are
more similar to other medical procedures than to typical human
ways of providing nutrition and hydration, for example, a sip of
water. 217 6 The majority similarly concludes that
artificial feedings such as nasogastric tubes, gastrotomies,
and intravenous infusions are significantly different from
bottle-feeding or spoonfeeding - they are medical proce-
dures with inherent risks and possible side effects, instituted
by skilled health-care providers to compensate for impaired
physical functioning. Analytically, artificial feeding by
means of a nasogastric tube or intravenous infusion can be
seen as equivalent to artificial breathing by means of a res-
pirator. Both prolong life through mechanical means when
the body is no longer able to perform a vital bodily function
on its own.277
Accordingly, withdrawal or withholding of artificial feeding, like
any other medical treatment, would only be sanctioned if there
is sufficient proof to satisfy one of the court-defined
standards.2 7 8
It is widely recognized that it is medically and ethically per-
missible to withdraw artificial feeding from patients in a persis-
tent vegetative state, when the patient or family has indicated
that that is what the patient would have wanted.2 9 One clinician
has suggested that there are grave implications if we maintain
that food and water must never be withheld, even from patients
in irreversible coma. It would mean perpetuating a "whole gen-
eration of Karen Quinlans."8 0 Others, who agree, have argued
that under specific circumstances, intravenous fluids are not
morally required for dying patients. They contend that giving
such solutions to a terminally ill comatose patient is a tradi-
tional maneuver whose only major benefit may be to the medical
and nursing staff in that it gives them the "emotional satisfac-
276. Id.
277. In re Conroy, 98 N.J. at 373, 486 A.2d at 1236.
278. Id. at 374, 486 A.2d at 1236.
279. See, e.g., PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 48, at 190; Lynn & Chil-
dress, supra note 275, at 18; Wanzer, The Physician's Responsibility, supra note 1, at
957.
280. Steinbock, The Removal of Mr. Herbert's Feeding Tube, 13
HASTINGS CENTER REP. 14 (1983).
19861
43
PACE LAW REVIEW
tion and comfort of thinking that at least something is being
done.' 28 1
Citing authorities in medicine and ethics, 2  the Conroy
court discusses risks and complications that may ensue from
nasogastric feedings in further support of its equation of artifi-
cial feeding with other medical treatments. The court concludes
that "it cannot be assumed that it will always be beneficial for
.an incompetent patient to receive artificial feeding or harmful
for him not to receive it."2 83
Opponents may contend that the court is setting a trend to-
ward wider discretion in decisions to withdraw or withhold
treatment from terminally ill patients. Some fear a "slippery
slope whereby the lives of all terminally ill and handicapped
people are endangered. '28' 4 However, the court is not unmindful
of these serious concerns, having established strict procedural
guidelines to guard against the enormous potential for abuse.28 5
D. Procedural Safeguards
There are many nursing home residents like Claire Conroy.
They are a particularly vulnerable population - often quite
elderly, most suffering from crippling disabilities and mental im-
pairments, and often without surviving family members .28
Added to this social isolation, physicians play a very limited role
in their lives, visiting infrequently and then only for brief peri-
ods of time.287 Furthermore, nursing homes suffer from peculiar
industry-wide problems and are themselves a troublesome com-
281. See Towers, Irreversible Coma and Withdrawal of Life Support: Is it Murder
if the IV Line is Disconnected?, 8 J. MED. ETHICS 203, 205 (1982). See also Micetich,
Steinecker & Thomasma, Are Intravenous Fluids Morally Required for a Dying Pa-
tient?, 143 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 975 (1983).
282. See Lo & Dornbrand, Sounding Board: Guiding the Hand that Feeds: Caring
for the Demented Elderly, 311 NEW ENG. J. MED. 402, 403 (1984); Lynn & Childress,
supra note 275, at 18, 20; Paris & Fletcher, Infant Doe Regulations and the Absolute
Requirement to Use Nourishment and Fluids for the Dying Infant, 11 L. MED. &
HEALTH CARE 210, 211-13 (1983); Zerwekh, The Dehydration Question, 13 NURSING 47,
49 (1983).
283. In re Conroy, 98 N.J. at 374, 486 A.2d at 1236.
284. Steinbock, supra note 280, at 16.
285. See supra text accompanying notes 225-33.
286. In re Conroy, 98 N.J. at 375, 486 A.2d at 1237.
287. Id.
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ponent of an ever-pressured and burdened heath care system.'"
Cognizant of the significant differences in the patients, the
health care providers and the institutional structures of nursing
homes and hospitals, 89 the court recognized that it had an obli-
gation to protect the special needs of patients confined to nurs-
ing .homes. The New Jersey Supreme Court thus created a
multi-step procedure2 00 which must be complied with before life-
sustaining treatment may be removed from a nursing home resi-
dent like Claire Conroy. The procedure requires participation
and review by the Office of the Ombudsman as well as two addi-
tional physicians independent of the nursing home and the pa-
tient in question.
These procedural requirements should quell the fears of
those who may shudder at the progression"' from Quinlan29 1 (in
which the respirator was removed from a comatose patient in a
persistent vegetative state) to Barber293 (in which a respirator,
nasogastric tube and intravenous line were removed from a co-
matose patient in a persistent vegetative state) to Hier" '4 (in
which surgery was withheld from an incompetent but nonco-
matose patient) to Conroy (in which removal of a nasogastric
tube was sanctioned for an incompetent but noncomatose pa-
tient if any one of the court-delineated standards was met).
In fact, these safeguards may be too comprehensive when
viewed in conjunction with the "subjective test '295 set forth by
the court. That is to say, it would appear to be unnecessary to
require notification of the ombudsman when it is clear that the
particular patient would have refused the treatment under the
288. Id. at 376, 486 A.2d at 1237-38. See also SENATE SUBCOMM. ON LONG-TERM
CARE OF THE SPECIAL COMM. ON AGING, NURSING HOME CARE IN THE UNITED STATES: FAIL-
URE IN PUBLIC POLICY, S. REP. No. 1420, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1974).
289. See In re Conroy, 98 N.J. at 375, 486 A.2d at 1237.
290. See supra text accompanying notes 227-33.
291. See McCormick, Caring or Starving? The Case of Claire Conroy, AMERICA, Apr.
6, 1983, at 273.
292. In re Quinlin, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976). For a
more extensive discussion of this case, see supra text accompanying notes 80-85.
293. Barber v. Superior Court, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484 (1983). For
a more extensive discussion of this case, see supra text accompanying notes 121-33.
294. In re Hier, 464 N.E.2d 959 (Mass. App. Ct.), review denied, 392 Mass. 1101,
465 N.E.2d 261 (1984). For a more extensive discussion of this case, see supra text ac-
companying notes 134-49.
295. See supra text accompanying notes 195-206.
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circumstances involved. There would be no "abuse" in carrying
out the formerly expressed intent of the now incompetent pa-
tient. If the patient had prepared a living will, given an oral di-
rective to a family member or friend, or in a durable power of
attorney had indicated his desire not to be treated or sustained
under certain circumstances - that should be sufficient. Fur-
thermore, if the patient had voiced reactions with regard to
medical treatment administered to others, or if it could be de-
duced from the patient's religious beliefs or from a consistent
pattern of conduct concerning prior medical decisions, that
should be sufficient to effectuate the very personal right to con-
trol one's own life and death.
V. Conclusion
The New Jersey Supreme Court's decision in In re Conroy
should be applauded. Absent guidelines from the legislature,
families and physicians had been forced to make life-or-death
decisions for incompetent patients within uncertain boundaries.
The New Jersey court stepped carefully through this struggle
between the head and the heart and enunciated more extensive
decisionmaking standards than had heretofore been recognized
by any court.296 It overcame the emotional repugnance against
discontinuance of nutrition in its determination that artificial
nourishment is, in fact, medical treatment and as such may be
withheld or withdrawn from incompetent patients under de-
tailed judicial guidelines.
The court has delineated stringent procedures to protect the
rights of incompetent patients and to ameliorate a difficult ethi-
cal problem facing the medical profession. The procedures re-
quire notification of and review by the ombudsman as well as
participation of two independent physicians to guard against
any feared abuse.2 97 Thus, the necessity of proving pain and suf-
296. See supra text accompanying notes 194-216.
297. On March 6, 1986, in the first legal test of the Conroy decision, the State
Ombudsman for the Institutionalized Elderly denied a request to remove a feeding tube
from a comatose nursing home patient, Hilda M. Peter. The decision was based on the
finding that the patient might live for years with the feeding tube in place. Thus, the
life-expectancy criterion - that a patient must have a life expectancy of a year or less
before life support can be removed - had not been satisfied. The ombudsman denied
the request to remove the feeding tube even though the patient was in a persistent vege-
[Vol. 6:219
46http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol6/iss2/3
IN RE CONROY
fering appears inappropriate in these already unfortunate situa-
tions. Pain as the sole measure of a person's best interests
"eclipses a whole cluster of other human values that have a
proper place in the subtle weighing that will ultimately deter-
mine how life should end. '298
Helen L. Siegal
tative state and, prior to her illness, had expressed her desire not to be kept "alive as a
vegetable." See Sullivan, Ombudsman Bars Food-Tube Removal, N.Y. Times, Mar. 7,
1986, at B2, col. 1.
298. In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 394, 486 A.2d 1209, 1247 (1985).
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